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Abstract
A strong correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy proﬁle that is immune to
joint deviations. Diﬀerent notions of strong correlated equilibria have been deﬁned
in the literature. One major diﬀerence among those deﬁnitions is the stage in which
coalitions can plan a joint deviation: before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the deviating
players receive their part of the correlated proﬁle. In this paper we show that an
ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium (Moreno & Wooders, Games Econ. Behav. 17
(1996), 80-113) is immune to deviations at all stages. Thus the set of ex-ante strong
correlated equilibria is included in all other sets of strong correlated equilibria.
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1 Introduction
The ability of players to communicate prior to playing a non-cooperative game,
inﬂuences the set of self-enforcing outcomes of that game. The communica-
tion allows the players to correlate their play, and to implement a correlated
strategy proﬁle as a feasible non-binding agreement. For such an agreement to
be self-enforcing, it has to be stable against plausible coalitional deviations.
Two notions in the literature describe such self-enforcing agreements: a strong
correlated equilibrium is a correlated proﬁle that is stable against all coali-
tional deviations, while a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium is a correlated
proﬁle that is stable against self-enforcing coalitional deviations ([6]). For a
coalition of a single player, any deviation is self-enforcing. For a coalition of
more than one player, a deviation is self-enforcing if there is no further self-
enforcing and improving deviation by one of its proper sub-coalitions. The
main focus of this paper is on the former notion.
A correlated strategy proﬁle can be implemented by a mediator who pri-
vately recommends each player which action to play. It can also be imple-
mented by a pre-play signaling process, a revealing protocol, that includes
payoﬀ-irrelevant private and public signals (sunspots). Each player deduces
his recommended action from the signals he has received. In the existing lit-
erature it is assumed that all the signals are received simultaneously by all
the players ([9,13,25,26,29,30]). However, the revealing protocol may be more
complex. Few examples are:
• The recommendations can be revealed consecutively by private signals in a
pre-speciﬁed order. An example for such a protocol is the polite cheap-talk
protocol in [18], which implements a large set of strong correlated equilibria
as strong Nash equilibria in an extended game with cheap-talk. 2
• The players can receive private signals in a pre-speciﬁed order, where each
signal includes partial information about the player's recommended action. 3
• The order in which the recommendations are revealed to the players may
depend on a private lottery.
So that a revealing protocol can implement a correlated equilbirum it should
2 Cheap-talk is pre-play, unmediated, non-binding, non-veriﬁable communication
among players (see [14] for a good nontechnical introduction). A cheap-talk protocol
is polite if at each stage at most one player sends a message.
3 For example, at each stage a player may be informed about a new unrecommended
action: if the possible actions of a player are {a, b, c} he may ﬁrst be informed that
the recommended action is not b, and at a later stage be informed that it is not c
as well.
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satisfy two properties. First, at the end of the protocol each player should
know the action recommended to him. Second, no player should obtain any
information about the actions recommended to the other players, except the
conditional probability, given his own recommended action.
When all the players receive their recommended actions simultaneously, a
coalition of players may communicate, share their information, and plan a joint
deviation before, or after, the recommendations are revealed. In [25,26,29] it
is assumed that players may only plan deviations at the ex-ante stage, before
receiving the recommendations. In [9,13,30] it is assumed that players may only
plan deviations at the ex-post stage, after receiving the recommendations.
When the players receive several signals, not necessarily simultaneously, they
may communicate, share information, and plan coalitional deviations at dif-
ferent stages of the revealing protocol. By sharing information, a coalition
of players may get information about the actions recommended to players
outside the coalition, and may use this information to implement proﬁtable
deviations. Similar to the existing literature of simultaneous revealing pro-
tocols, we focus on protocols in which sharing information among deviating
players does not allow them to obtain any information about the actions rec-
ommended to the other players, except the conditional probability, given their
own recommended actions.
The use of a joint deviation requires the unanimous agreement of all the mem-
bers of the deviating coalition. A player agrees to be part of a joint deviation
if, given his own information the deviation is proﬁtable to himself. Thus, if a
joint deviation is implemented, then it is common knowledge among its mem-
bers that each of them believes that the deviation is proﬁtable: the agreement
of a player to participate in the joint deviation is a public signal to all the
other deviating players that he believes that the deviation is proﬁtable (see
the example in Sec. 3 for more details). We model the information structure of
the deviating players by an incomplete information model (with the common
prior assumption) a` la Aumann ([4]). In the spirit of the concept of strong
correlated equilibrium, we assume that deviations are binding: A deviation
is implemented with the assistance of a new mediator. The deviating players
truthfully report their information to the new mediator, and they are bound
to follow his recommendations, even if new information at a later stage makes
the deviation unproﬁtable. If the deviating players are not bound to follow the
recommendations of the new mediator, the solution concept is close in spirit
to the coalition-proof notion.
A correlated strategy proﬁle is an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium if,
for every revealing protocol that implements it, and for every stage of the
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protocol, there is no coalition with a proﬁtable deviation. A correlated strategy
proﬁle is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium ([26]) if there is no coalition
with a proﬁtable deviation at the ex-ante stage. Our main result shows that
the two notions coincide: an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is resistant
to deviations at all stages of any revealing protocol that implements it. An
immediate corollary is that the set of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria is
included in all other sets of strong correlated equilibria, as deﬁned in the
literature mentioned above.
One could hope that similar results may be obtained for the coalition-proof
notions. However, in Section 5 we demonstrate that the ex-ante coalition-proof
notion is not appropriate to frameworks in which coalitions can plan devia-
tions at all stages. In Section 6 we discuss diﬀerent approaches for coalitional
stability, present the diﬀerent notions of strong and coalition-proof equilibria,
and discuss the implications of the main result.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and the main
result. The result is demonstrated with an example in Section 3, and proven
in Section 4. We deal with the coalition-proof notion in Section 5, and discuss
the implications of the result in Section 6.
2 Model and Deﬁnitions
2.1 Preliminary Deﬁnitions
A game in strategic form G is deﬁned as: G =
(
N, (Ai)i∈N , (u
i)i∈N
)
, where
N is the ﬁnite and non-empty set of players. For each i ∈ N , Ai is player
i 's ﬁnite and non-empty set of actions, and ui is player i 's utility (payoﬀ)
function, a real-valued function on A =
∏
i∈N
Ai. The multi-linear extension of ui
to ∆ (A) is still denoted by ui. A member of A is called an action proﬁle, and a
member of ∆ (A) is called a (correlated) strategy proﬁle. A coalition S is a non-
empty member of 2N . For simplicity of notation, the coalition {i} is denoted
i. Given a coalition S, let AS =
∏
i∈S
Ai, and let −S = {i ∈ N | i /∈ S} denote
the complementary coalition. A member of ∆(AS) is called a (correlated)
S -strategy proﬁle. Given q ∈ ∆(A) and aS ∈ AS, we deﬁne q|S ⊆ ∆(AS)
to be q|S(aS) =
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(aS, a−S), and for simplicity we omit the subscript:
q(aS) = q|S(aS). Given aS s.t. q(aS) > 0, we deﬁne q(a−S|aS) = q(aS ,a−S)q(aS) .
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2.2 All-stage Strong Correlated Equilibrium
A state space is a probability space, (Ω,B, µ) that describes all parameters
that may be the object of uncertainty on the part of the players. We interpret
Ω as the space of all possible states of the world, B as the σ-algebra of all
measurable events, and µ as the common prior.
Given a non-null event E ∈ B and a random variable x : Ω → X (where
X is a ﬁnite set), let x(E) ∈ ∆(X) denote the posterior distribution of x
conditioned on the event E. The implementation of an agreement (a correlated
strategy proﬁle) by a mediator or by a signaling process is modeled by a
random variable a : Ω→ A, which satisﬁes that the prior distribution a(Ω) is
equal to the agreement distribution.
Deﬁnition 1 Let G be a game, q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, and (Ω,B, µ) a
state space. A recommendation proﬁle that implements q is a random variable
a = (ai)i∈N : Ω→ A that satisﬁes: a(Ω) = q.
A (joint) deviation of a coalition S is a random variable (in Ω) that is condi-
tionally independent of a−S given aS .
Deﬁnition 2 Let G be a game, q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, S ⊆ N a coalition,
(Ω,B, µ) a state space, and a : Ω → A a recommendation proﬁle that imple-
ments q. A deviation (of S from a) is a random variable dS = (di)i∈S : Ω→ AS
that is conditionally independent of a−S given aS .
The interpretation is the following: If the players of S agree to use deviation dS,
they implement it with the assistance of a new mediator. The new mediator
receives the S -part of the recommendation proﬁle, but he does not receive
any information about the actions recommended to the non-deviating players.
Thus, the new recommendations he sends to the deviating players may depend
only on aS , but not on a−S .
When the members of a coalition S consider the implementation of a joint
deviation, they are in a situation of incomplete information: each player may
know his recommended action, and may have additional private information
acquired when communicating with the other deviating players. We assume
that the deviating players have no information about the actions recommended
to the non-deviating players, except the conditional probability given the in-
formation they have about their recommended actions. We model this by the
following deﬁnition of a consistent information structure.
Deﬁnition 3 Let G be a game, q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, S ⊆ N a coalition,
(Ω,B, µ) a state space, and a : Ω → A a recommendation proﬁle that im-
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plements q. An information structure (of S ) is a |S|-tuple of partitions of Ω
(F i)i∈S, whose join (
∧
i∈S
F i, the coarsest common reﬁnement of (F i)i∈S) consists
of non-null events. We say that (F i)i∈S is a consistent information structure,
if ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈ S, ∀a ∈ A, a (F i(ω)) (a) = aS (F i(ω))
(
aS
)
· q(a−S | aS).
We interpret F i as the information partition of player i ; that is, if the true
state of the world is ω ∈ Ω then player i is informed of that element F i(ω) of
F i that contains ω.
When each player considers whether the implementation of a deviation is
proﬁtable to himself, he compares his conditional expected payoﬀ when playing
the original agreement and when implementing the deviation. A player agrees
to deviate, only if the latter conditional expectation is larger. Formally, let
G be a game, q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, S ⊆ N a coalition, i ∈ S a player,
(Ω,B, µ) a state space, a : Ω → A a recommendation proﬁle, dS : Ω → AS
a deviation, and (F i)i∈S a consistent information structure. The conditional
expected payoﬀs of player i in ω ∈ Ω are:
• The conditional expected payoﬀ when all the players follow the agreement:
uif (ω) =
∫
F i(ω)
ui (a(ω)) dµ
• The conditional expected payoﬀ when the members of S deviate, by imple-
menting dS, and the players in −S follow the agreement:
uid(ω) =
∫
F i(ω)
ui
((
dS, a−S
)
(ω)
)
dµ
If the players in S unanimously decide to implement a deviation in some
state ω ∈ Ω, then it is common knowledge (in ω) that each player believes to
earn more if the deviation is implemented. In that case we say that the joint
deviation is proﬁtable. Formally:
Deﬁnition 4 ([3]) Let G be a game, S ⊆ N a coalition, (Ω,B, µ) a state
space, (F i)i∈S an information structure, and ω ∈ Ω a state. An event E ∈ B is
common knowledge at ω if E includes that member of the meet Fmeet = ∧
i∈S
F i
that contains ω.
Deﬁnition 5 Let G be a game. q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, S ⊆ N a coali-
tion, (Ω,B, µ) a state space, and a : Ω → A a recommendation proﬁle that
implements q. A deviation (of S ) dS is proﬁtable, if there exists a consistent
information structure (F i)i∈S and a state ω0 ∈ Ω such that it is common
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knowledge in ω0 that ∀i ∈ S, uid(ω) > uif (ω). In that case, we say that dS is
a proﬁtable deviation (from the reccomendation proﬁle a) with respect to the
information structure (F i)i∈S.
We can now deﬁne an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium as a strategy
proﬁle, from which no coalition has a proﬁtable deviation.
Deﬁnition 6 Let G be a game. A strategy proﬁle q ∈ ∆(A) is an all-stage
strong correlated equilibrium if for every reccomendation proﬁle a : Ω → A
that implements q, no coalition S ⊆ N has a proﬁtable deviation.
2.3 Main Result
A proﬁle is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium, if no coalition has a
proﬁtable deviation at the ex-ante stage, when the players have no information
about the recommendations.
Deﬁnition 7 Let G be a game and (Ω,B, µ) a state space. A strategy proﬁle
q ∈ ∆(A) is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium if for every reccomenda-
tion proﬁle a : Ω→ A that implements q, no coalition S ⊆ N has a proﬁtable
deviation with respect to the ex-ante information structure (F i)i∈S that sat-
isﬁes ∀i,F i = Ω.
One can verify that Def. 7 is equivalent to the deﬁnition of ([26]). The deﬁnition
immediately implies that an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium is also an
ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium. The main result shows that the converse
is also true, and thus the two notions coincide.
Theorem 8 A correlated strategy proﬁle is an ex-ante strong correlated equi-
librium if and only if it is an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium.
3 An Example of the Main Result
In the following example we present an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium
in a 3-player game, and a speciﬁc deviation that is considered by the grand
coalition during a revealing protocol. At ﬁrst glance, one may think that this
deviation is proﬁtable to all the players conditioned on their posterior infor-
mation at that stage, but a more thorough analysis reveals that this is not
the case. The analysis in this example provides the intuition for the use of a
model of incomplete information a` la Aumann ([4]), for the common knowledge
requirement in Def. 5 of a proﬁtable deviation, and for the main result.
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Table 1 presents the matrix representation of a 3-player game, where player 1
chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column, and player 3 chooses the matrix.
Table 1
A 3-Player Game With An Ex-Ante Strong Correlated Equilibrium
c1 c2 c3
b1 b2 b3 b1 b2 b3 b1 b2 b3
a1 10,10,10 5, 20,5 0,0,0 5,5,20 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
a2 20,5,5 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
a3 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 7,11,12
Let q be the proﬁle:
(
1
4
(a1, b1, c1) ,
1
4
(a2, b1, c1) ,
1
4
(a1, b2, c1) ,
1
4
(a1, b1, c2)
)
,
with an expected payoﬀ of 10 to each player. Observe that q is an ex-ante
strong correlated equilibrium:
• The proﬁle q is a correlated equilibrium, and thus no player has a unilateral
proﬁtable deviation.
• No coalition of two players has a proﬁtable deviation, because their un-
certainty about the action recommended to the third player prevents them
from earning together more than 20 by a joint deviation.
• The grand coalition cannot earn more than a total payoﬀ of 30.
Now, consider a stage of a revealing protocol in which player 1 has received a
recommendation to play a1, player 2 has received a recommendation to play
a2, and player 3 has not received a recommendation yet. No player knows
whether the other players have received their recommended actions. At ﬁrst
glance, the implementation of the deviation d(·) = (a3, b3, c3), which gives a
payoﬀ of (7, 11, 12), may look proﬁtable to all the players:
• Conditioned on his recommended action (a1), player 1 has an expected
payoﬀ of 62
3
, and thus d is proﬁtable to him. The same is true for player 2.
• Player 3 does not know his recommended action. His ex-ante expected payoﬀ
is 10, and he would earn a payoﬀ of 12 by implementing d.
However, a more thorough analysis reveals that d is unproﬁtable for player 3.
Player 1 can only earn from d if he has received a recommendation to play a1.
Thus, if player 1 agrees to implement d, then it is common knowledge that he
has received a1. The expected payoﬀ of players 2 and 3, conditioned on that
player 1 has received a1, is 11
2
3
. Thus, if player 2 agrees to implement d (with
a payoﬀ of 11) it is common knowledge that he has more information: his
recommended action is a2. Therefore player 3 knows that if the others agree
to implement d, then their recommended actions are (a1, a2). Conditioned on
that, his expected payoﬀ is 15, and thus d is unproﬁtable for himself.
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4 The Proof of the Main Result
In this section we prove the main result. As discussed earlier, one direction
immediately follows from the deﬁnitions, and we only have to prove the other
direction:
Theorem 9 Every ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is an all-stage strong
correlated equilibrium.
In other words: If a proﬁtable deviation from an agreement q ∈ 4(A) exists,
then there also exists a proﬁtable ex-ante deviation from q.
PROOF. Let q ∈ ∆(A) be an agreement that is not an all-stage strong cor-
related equilibrium in a game G, (Ω,B, µ) the state space, and a : Ω → A
a recommendation proﬁle that implements q. There exists a coalition S ⊆ N
with a proﬁtable deviation dS : Ω → AS with respect to a consistent infor-
mation structure (F i)i∈S. This implies that there is a state ω0 ∈ Ω , such
that it is common knowledge in ω0 that ∀i, uid(ω) > uif (ω), i.e., Fmeet(ω0) ⊆{
ω | uid(ω) > uif (ω)
}
. For each deviating player i ∈ S, write Fmeet = Fmeet(ω0) =⋃˙
j
F ij where the F
i
j are disjoint members of F i, and let ωij ∈ F ij be a state
in F ij . We now construct an ex-ante proﬁtable deviation d
S
e with respect
to the ex-ante information structure (F ie)i∈S, which satisﬁes ∀i, F ie = Ω:
dSe (ω) =

dS(ω) ω ∈ Fmeet,
aS(ω) ω /∈ Fmeet.
Observe that dSe and a
−S are conditionally independent given aS, thus dSe is
a well-deﬁned deviation. Let uide(ω), u
i
fe(ω) be the conditional utilities of the
players with respect to (F ie)i∈S. We ﬁnish the proof by showing that dSe is
proﬁtable, i.e: ∀i ∈ S, ω ∈ Ω, uide(ω) > uife(ω).
uide(ω)− uife(ω) =
∫
F ie(ω)
(
ui
((
dSe , a
−S) (ω))− ui (a(ω))) dµ (1)
=
∫
Ω
(
ui
((
dSe , a
−S) (ω))− ui (a(ω))) dµ (2)
=
∫
Fmeet
(
ui
((
dSe , a
−S) (ω))− ui (a(ω))) dµ (3)
=
∫
Fmeet
(
ui
((
dS, a−S
)
(ω)
)
− ui (a(ω))
)
dµ (4)
=
∑
j
∫
F ij
(
ui
((
dS, a−S
)
(ω)
)
− ui (a(ω))
)
dµ (5)
=
∑
j
uid(ω
i
j)− uif (ωij) > 0 (6)
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Equation (2) is due to the equality F ie(ω) = Ω, (3) holds since d
S
e = a
−S outside
Fmeet, (4) holds since dSe = d
S in Fmeet, (5) follows from Fmeet =
.⋃
j
F ij , and
the last inequality is implied by Fmeet ⊆
{
ω | uid(ω) > uif (ω)
}
. QED
5 Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibria
In Sec. 4 we have shown that an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is
also appropriate to frameworks in which players can plan deviations at all
stages. A natural question is whether a similar result holds for the notion of
coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. 4 We show that the answer is negative,
by presenting an example, adapted from [9], in which there is an ex-ante
coalition-proof correlated equilibrium that is not a self-enforcing agreement in
a framework in which communication is possible at all stages. Table 2 presents
a two-player game and an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilibrium.
Table 2
A Two-Player Game and an Ex-ante Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium
b1 b2 b3
a1 6,6 -2,0 0,7
a2 2,2 2,2 0,0
a3 0,0 0,0 3,3
b1 b2 b3
a1 1/2 0 0
a2 1/4 1/4 0
a3 0 0 0
We ﬁrst show that the proﬁle presented in Table 2 is an ex-ante coalition-proof
equilibrium. Observe that the proﬁle is a correlated equilibrium. [26] shows
that in a two-player game, every correlated equilibrium that is not Pareto-
dominated by another correlated equilibrium is a coalition-proof correlated
equilibrium. The proﬁle gives each player a payoﬀ of 4. Thus we prove that it
is an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilibrium, by showing that any corre-
lated equilibrium q gives player 1 a payoﬀ of at most 4. Let x = q (a1, b1). Ob-
serve that q (a2, b1) ≥ x/2 because otherwise player 2 would have a proﬁtable
deviation: playing b3 when recommended b1. This implies q (a2, b2) ≥ x/2, be-
cause otherwise player 1 would have a proﬁtable deviation: playing a1 when
recommended a2. Thus the payoﬀ of q conditioned on that the recommenda-
tion proﬁle is in A = ((a1, b1) , (a2, b1) , (a2, b2)) is at most 4, and the fact that
4 Recall ([26]) that an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilibrium is a correlated
strategy proﬁle from which no coalition has a self-enforcing and improving ex-ante
deviation. For a coalition of a single player any ex-ante deviation is self-enforcing.
For a larger coalition, an ex-ante deviation is self-enforcing if there is no further
self-enforcing and improving ex-ante deviation by one of its proper sub-coalitions.
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the payoﬀ of player 1 outside A is at most 3 completes the proof.
We now explain why this proﬁle is not a self-enforcing agreement in a frame-
work in which the players can also plan deviations at the ex-post stage. Assume
that the players have agreed to play the proﬁle, and player 1 has received a
recommendation to play a2. In that case, he can communicate with player 2
at the ex-post stage, tell him that he has received a2 (and thus if the players
follow the recommendation proﬁle they would get a payoﬀ of 2), and suggest
a joint deviation: playing (a3, b3). As player 1 has no incentive to lie, player 2
would believe him, and they would both play (a3, b3). This ex-post deviation
is self-enforcing because (a3, b3) is a Nash equilibrium.
Observe that the same deviation is not self-enforcing at the ex-ante stage. If
the players agree at the ex-ante stage to implement a deviation that changes
(a2, b1) into (a3, b3), then player 2 would have a proﬁtable sub-deviation: play-
ing b3 when recommended b1. Similarly, if they agree to implement a deviation
that changes (a2, b2) into (a3, b3), then player 1 would have a proﬁtable sub-
deviation: playing a1 when recommended a2.
6 Discussion
6.1 Approaches for Coalitional Stability
Self-enforcing agreements in environments where players can freely discuss
their strategies before the play starts, have to be stable against coalitional
deviations. A few notions in the literature present diﬀerent approaches for
coalitional stability.
The ﬁrst approach, is the Pareto dominance reﬁnement, in which the set of
Nash equilibria is reﬁned by restricting attention to its eﬃcient frontier. This
approach is popular in applications due to its advantages: existence in all
games and the simplicity of its use. However, when there are more than 2
players, it ignores the ability of coalitions other than the grand coalition to
privately agree upon a joint deviation. 5
Another approach is to explicitly model the procedure of communication as
an extended-form game that speciﬁes how messages are interchanged (e.g.:
[5,15,28]). However, the results are sensitive to the exact procedure employed,
and usually strong restrictions have to be made to isolate the desired outcome.
5 As discussed in [6,35]. [35] presents a set of conditions that if satisﬁed, the two
notions of Pareto dominance reﬁnement and coalition-proof equilibrium coincide.
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A diﬀerent approach is the farsighted coalitional stability. Alternative varia-
tions are discussed in: [10,16,17,24,33,34]. 6 These notions focus on environ-
ments where deviations are public. At each stage coalitions propose deviations
from the current status-quo outcome, until nobody wishes to deviate further.
The set of possible ﬁnal outcomes is deﬁned using stable sets a` la von-Neumann
& Morgenstern ([32]). This approach is less appropriate when coalitions can
privately plan deviations. 7
6.2 Strong and Coalition-Proof Equilibria
A Nash equilibrium is strong ([2]) if no coalition, taking the actions of its
complement as given, has an uncorrelated deviation that beneﬁts all of its
members. A drawback of this notion, is that it exists in only a relatively small
set of games. 8 [6] presents a wider reﬁnement of Nash equilibrium, which
exists in more games: a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium
is coalition-proof if no coalition has a proﬁtable self-enforcing uncorrelated
deviation. For a coalition of a single player any deviation is self-enforcing. For
a coalition of more than one player, a deviation is self-enforcing if there is
no further self-enforcing and improving uncorrelated deviation by one of its
proper sub-coalitions. 9 The notion of coalition-proof equilibrium has been
useful in a variety of applied contexts, such as: menu auctions ([7]), oligopolies
([8,11,12,31]), and common agency games ([22]).
These notions focus on environments where coalitions can privately commu-
nicate before the play starts, and plan a joint deviation. However, they ignore
6 Also called negotiation-proof equilibrium and full coalitional equilibrium.
7 [34, Section 1] presents an example for the diﬀerence between a negotiation-proof
equilibrium and a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. Observe that the negotiation-
proof equilibrium in this example, the proﬁle (U,L,A), is not a plausible outcome
if the coalition ({1, 2}) can privately deviate.
8 Examples for games where strong Nash equilibria exist are congestion games
([19]); games where the preferences satisfying independence of irrelevant choices,
anonymity, and partial rivalry ([20]); and games where the core of the cooperative
game derived from the original normal form game, is non-empty (see [21], and the
references within). Conditions for the equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash
equilibria are presented in [21] (games with population monotonicity property) and
in [22] (common agency games).
9 Observe that only members of the deviating coalition may contemplate deviations
from the deviation. This rules out the possibility that members of the deviating
coalition might form a pact to deviate further with someone not included in this
coalition. This limitation has been criticized, especially in the literature that deals
with the farsighted coalitional stability approach (described earlier).
12
the fact that the same private communication allows the players to correlate
their moves. This deﬁciency is overcome by the notions of strong and coalition-
proof correlated equilibria. A correlated equilibrium is strong if no coalition
has a (possibly correlated) joint deviation that beneﬁts all of its members. The
close connection between strong correlated equilibrium and private pre-play
communication is demonstrated by:
• The result in [18], which shows that any punishable 10 ex-ante strong
correlated equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium in an extended game
with cheap-talk. 11
• The example in [27] of an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium that is the
only plausible outcome of a game with pre-play communication, as experi-
mentally demonstrated in the referred paper.
6.3 Relations among Diﬀerent Notions of Strong Correlated Equilibria
A deﬁciency of the notion of strong correlated equilibrium, is that there are
six diﬀerent variants of it in the literature: three ex-ante notions and three ex-
post notions. In this subsection we present these notions, the relations among
them, and the implications of the main result.
Notions of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria have been presented in [26,29,25].
Our ex-ante deﬁnition is equivalent to the deﬁnition in [26]. In [29] deviating
coalitions are not allowed to construct new correlation devices, and are limited
to use only uncorrelated deviations. 12 In [25] only some of the coalitions can
coordinate deviations. In both cases the sets of feasible deviations are included
in our set of deviations, and thus our set of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria
is included in the other sets of equilibria.
An ex-post strong correlated equilibrium can be deﬁned in our framework,
as a proﬁle which is resistant to deviations at the ex-post stage when each
10 Loosely speaking, a strategy proﬁle is punishable if it Pareto-dominates another
strategy proﬁle, even when the deviating players do a joint scheme.
11 The implementation presented in [18] is only as a bn/2c-strong Nash equilibrium:
an equilibrium that is resistant to deviations of coalitions with less than n/2 players. If
one assumes that the players are computationally restricted and one-way functions
exist, then the implementation can be as a strong Nash equilibrium (see [1,23]).
12 In [29]'s setup, the mediator can send an indirect signal to each player, which
holds more information than the recommendation itself. In that case, the uncorre-
lated deviation is a function from the set of the S -part of the signals to the set of
uncorrelated S -strategy proﬁles. In our framework, in which coalitions can use new
correlation devices, any ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium that can be imple-
mented by indirect signals, can also be implemented by a direct correlation device.
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player knows his recommendation (i.e., no coalition S ⊆ N has a proﬁtable
deviation with respect to an ex-post information structure (F i)i∈S, in which:
∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈ S, ∃ai ∈ Ai s.t. ai (F i(ω)) (ai) = 1).
Notions of ex-post strong correlated equilibria have been presented in [13,30,9].
In [13] a deviating coalition can only use deviations that improve the condi-
tional utilities of all deviating players for all possible recommendation pro-
ﬁles. 13 In [30] a coalition S can only use pure deviations (functions dS : AS →
AS). In [9], a coalition S can only use deviations that are implemented if the
S-part of the recommendation proﬁle aS is included in some set ES ⊆ AS,
which satisﬁes:
(1) If aS ∈ ES, each player earns from implementing the deviation;
(2) If aS /∈ ES, at least one player looses from implementing the deviation.
It can be shown that those conditions imply the existence of a proﬁtable
deviation with respect to an ex-post information structure. 14 Thus our set of
ex-post strong correlated equilibria is included in the other sets of equilibria.
The main result reveals inclusion relations among the diﬀerent notions of
strong correlated equilibria, which described in Fig. 1. 15 Thus, [26]'s ex-ante
notion is much more robust than originally presented: It is an appropriate no-
tion not only for frameworks where players can only communicate before re-
ceiving the the agreement's recommendations of, but for any pre-play signaling
process that is used to implement the agreement, and for any communication
possibilities among the players.
Figure 1. Relations among Diﬀerent Notions of Strong Correlated Equilibria (SCE)
13 It is equivalent to requiring that ∀i ∈ S, ω ∈ Ω uid(ω) > uif (ω).
14 The information structure is such that each deviator would know his recommen-
dation and whether aS(ω) ∈ ES .
15 See [26, Section 4] for an example of an ex-post strong correlated equilibrium that
is not an ex-ante equilibrium.
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6.4 Coalition-proof Correlated Equilibria
A correlated equilibrium is coalition-proof if no coalition has a (possibly cor-
related) proﬁtable self-enforcing deviation. Again, a deﬁciency of this notion
is that there are six diﬀerent variants of it in the literature (3 ex-ante and 3
ex-post). 16 It is possible to extend the model of incomplete information, and
deﬁne a notion of all-stage coalition-proof correlated equilibrium, by using an
appropriate notion of consistent reﬁnements of information structures. How-
ever, the example in Section 5 shows that this notion does not coincide with
the ex-ante coalition-proof notion, nor that there is any inclusion relations
among the diﬀerent coalition-proof notions. 17 Thus, the notion of coalition-
proof correlated equilibrium is not robust: it is sensitive to the exact properties
of the revealing protocol.
6.5 Extensions of the Main Result
(1) Bayesian games: [26] presents a notion of ex-ante strong communication
equilibrium in Bayesian games. The main result can be extended to this
setup as well, to show that an ex-ante strong communication equilibrium
is resistant to deviations at all stages.
(2) k-strong equilibria: In [18] an ex-ante notion of k-strong correlated equi-
librium is deﬁned as a strategy proﬁle that is resistant to all coalitional
deviations of up to k players. The main result can be directly extended to
this notion as well: An ex-ante k -strong correlated equilibrium is resistant
to deviations of up to k players at all stages.
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